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The strength of party brands means that fighting for marginal
districts is now much more expensive for candidates.
Concern about party polarization in Congress is by no means new, but using new research,
Henry A. Kim and Brad L. LeVeck argue that it can also lead to more expensive campaigns for
incumbents in marginal districts. They maintain that while strong party branding makes it much
easier for candidates to communicate their ideology in districts that like the party, in competitive
races, incumbent candidates must work hard, and spend more, to present more information to
show that they are closer to their district’s preferences than those of their party.
Over the past four decades, parties in the U.S. Congress have become increasingly polarized: 
the Democrats have moved further to the left while the Republicans have moved much further to
the right. Meanwhile, there is very little evidence that the US public has become similarly
polarized. This means that the two parties have moved further away from the average voter,
leaving one to wonder whether Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress pay any cost for
such behavior.
In a recent study, we find that there literally is a monetary cost to polarization. Incumbents have
always had to pay some cost of campaigning, largely to communicate their record to voters. However, thanks to
polarization, incumbents in competitive districts now have to spend much more than they used to in order to
assure voters that they are different from the rest of their parties.
To explain the logic behind our
findings, it helps to use an
analogy: Party labels are like
brands. When a consumer sees
the word “Starbucks” on the front
of a shop, they instantly know
what they’re going to get if they
walk inside. Similarly, placing the
label “Democrat” or “Republican”
on a politician helps voters know
what they’re going to get if they
vote for that politician. Vote for a
Republican, and you’ll likely get
lower taxes and less regulation
on business. Vote for a Democrat
and you’ll likely get more
spending on social services and
increased environmental
protections.
However, labels aren’t always
informative. The Starbucks brand is informative because Starbucks produces a highly consistent product, with
little variation from store to store. No matter where you go, you pretty much know what a cup of Starbucks’ coffee
will taste like. Likewise, a party label is more informative if politicians from that party vote in a highly consistent
fashion. In effect, polarization has made party brands more informative to voters because there is less variability
in how politicians from each party vote. To see this, consider Figure 1 below:
Figure 1 – Variation in party ideology 1970 – 2010
Each line plots the mean DW-
Nominate score for each party in
each year from 1970 to 2008. DW-
Nominate scores are a common
measure of a legislator’s inferred left-
right ideology, based on his or her
voting record. Here we see a well
known pattern: since the 1970’s the
parties have moved further apart,
with much of the movement coming
from the Republican Party. However,
there is also another important trend
in this data. The colored band behind
each of the lines shows the standard
deviation in each party’s DW-
Nominate scores. This is a statistical
measure of how much voting records
vary within each party. The wider the
colored band behind each line, the
more variable a party is in terms of
how its members vote. For example,
the band is very wide for Democrats
in the 1970s because House
Democrats in this era varied quite a
bit on whether they voted as an
economic conservative or as an
economic liberal. Over time, however,
the band for each party has become
narrower, as there is less ideological
variance within each party:
Democrats vote more consistently for the same left-leaning bills while Republicans vote more consistently for the
same right-leaning bills.
Because there is less variability in the ideological makeup of each party, voters now have a better idea about what
they will get if they vote for an incumbent from a particular party. Even if a voter knows nothing about the
incumbent’s actual voting record, it is an increasingly good guess that the incumbent voted like other members of
his or her party.
For incumbents in districts that like their party’s “brand”, this is very helpful, as these incumbents can largely
ensure their own re-election simply by having the right party label next to their name on a ballot. These
incumbents do not need to engage in a lot of additional campaigning because voters automatically associate them
with a likeable party.
However, for the incumbents in districts that dislike their party, life has become much more difficult. Like the owner
of your local Starbucks franchise, these incumbents may need to spend more money differentiating themselves
from the national brand when that brand is locally unpopular (as an aside, a number of Starbucks stores have
actually faced a similar problem in the recent past).
To distinguish themselves from the rest of their party, incumbents can create a personal voting record that is much
closer to their district’s preferences. However voters do not automatically find out about the incumbent’s record. 
Instead, incumbents have to inform voters about their record through costly campaigning. Furthermore, due to the
growing strength of party brands, voters are increasingly certain that members of a particular party all act
according to a similar ideology. To change these voters’ minds now, incumbents have to present even more
information about their own record through more stump speeches and campaign ads, which, again, cost more
money.
Figure 2 below provide a general illustration of the trend we’re describing.  Each dot in the plot below represents
the amount that a House incumbent spent on campaigning in a particular election (adjusted for inflation). The
horizontal axis is a common measure of district partisanship, the vote share received by an incumbent’s party in
the last presidential election. In effect, this is a rough proxy for how well a district likes the national party brand of
an incumbent (it also happens to correlate highly with more sophisticated measures).
Figure 2 – Spending by incumbents and district partisanship
In the 1970’s, party brands were fairly weak and diluted, and the relationship between district partisanship and
spending was essentially flat. There was essentially no relationship between how much district liked and
incumbent’s party and how much that incumbent spent on their campaign.  However, by the 2000s parties had
become more cohesive in the way they voted, and, as a result, party brands had become much more informative.
In districts that favor an incumbent’s party brand (numbers closer to 100 on the horizontal axis), campaign
spending remained fairly low, but in districts that disfavor the party brand (closer to 0 on the horizontal axis)
campaign spending had practically skyrocketed.
Now, as in all studies based on historical data (rather than a controlled experiment), it is impossible to completely
exclude the possibility that this trend is driven by a different set of factors. However, we developed a mathematical
model to show that there are additional hypotheses that follow from our argument about party brands and
campaign spending. We then tested these additional hypotheses with a statistical model that controls for a
number of potentially confounding factors. For example, our theory also predicts the apparent non-linearity in the
graph above, whereby spending goes up even more dramatically in districts that really disfavor a party’s brand.
The fact that this and other hypotheses pan out gives us some additional confidence that our theory provides a
useful model for describing how polarization shapes incumbent spending in different localities.
Our ndings should change how we think about the role of party brands. Party brands are often treated as public
goods that aid the electoral prospects of party members. In contrast, we show that party brands are simply
externalities that help members in relatively safe districts, but harm the electoral prospects of incumbents in more
marginal districts. Both the positive and negative effects of the party’s brand become more intense as party
brands become more precise. Not only do campaigns become more expensive for incumbents in marginal
districts, but it also becomes more expensive for these incumbents to vote with their party. Both of these ndings
should encourage new research on how (and whether) parties can compensate marginal incumbents for the
increasing cost of party polarization.
This article is based on the American Political Science Review paper “Money, Reputation, and Incumbency in U.S.
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